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IN GENERAL PUBLIC USE: AN UNNECESSARY TEST IN
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES USING ADVANCED
SENSING TECHNOLOGY
Mike Petridis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Kyllo v. United States 1 created a rule with an unnecessary test
that can allow law enforcement to search a home, a person’s castle,
without a warrant. The Kyllo rule states: “[O]btaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—
at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public
use.” 2 This rule was intended to be forward-looking and anticipate
future technology. 3 However, the “general public use” test is a
loophole that can be used by future law enforcement officers to
conduct warrantless searches of homes in violation of Fourth
Amendment principles.
Danny Kyllo’s (“Kyllo”) home was scanned by an Agema
Thermovision 210, a thermal imager after law enforcement officials
suspected him of growing marijuana. 4 The scan of the home
determined that certain areas of the house were at a higher temperature
than surrounding homes. 5 The temperature difference indicated a

* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2021; Hunter College, B.A.
in Political Science 2013. I would like to thank my friend John Ladis for his help and support
over the years.
1 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
2 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 36. “[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or in development.” Id.
4 Id. at 29.
5 Id. at 30.
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strong possibility Kyllo was running halide lights, 6 which are used in
the growing of marijuana. 7 Based on the thermal imaging, informants,
and utility bills, the law enforcement officials were able to obtain a
search warrant for Kyllo’s home. 8 Agents found more than 100
marijuana plants. 9 Prosecutors indicted Kyllo with one count of
manufacturing marijuana. 10 Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence,11
but suppression was unsuccessful, and Kyllo “entered a conditional
guilty plea.” 12 As a result, “[t]he Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the
intrusiveness of thermal imaging.” 13 On remand, the District Court of
Oregon found that the Agema 210 “is a non-intrusive device that emits
no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being
radiated from the outside of the house.” 14 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals then held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy
in regard to the heat leaving his home, and there was “no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager did not expose
any intimate details.” 15 However, the Supreme Court held that the
Agema 210 scan was a search under the Fourth Amendment because a
device that is not in “general public use” explored details of a home
that could only be found through physical intrusion. 16
This Note will examine how the “general public use” test
creates a loophole that allows for unwarranted searches that violate the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Section II will examine the
6 Metal halide lights are commonly used for indoor growing because they produce a broad
spectrum of light which is useful for growing plants. Kevin Espiritu, Metal Halide Grow
Lights Explained and Reviewed, EPIC GARDENING, https://www.epicgardening.com/metalhalide-grow-lights/ (last updated May 20, 2019). Halide lights work by creating an electrical
arc to ionize mercury and halide. This chemical process requires a lot of power to run and
75% of the light produced is heat.
Metal Halide Lamps, EDISON TECH CTR.,
https://edisontechcenter.org/metalhalide.html (last visited May 6, 2020); see also Bill
Bernhardt, Metal Halide Bulbs: Workhorses of the Industry, CANNABIS CULTIVATION TODAY
(July 27, 2016), https://cannabisindustryinstitute.com/news/metal-halide-bulbs-workhorsesof-the-industry/.
7 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 31.
16 Id. at 40.
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original reasons behind the Fourth Amendment. These reasons will
then be applied to crafting a principle of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Section III will provide the history and evolution of the
property-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Section IV will
provide an overview of current “see through the wall” technology
available to law enforcement. In addition, this Note will compare
thermal imaging as it was when the Court decided Kyllo and the current
state of thermal imaging. Section V will examine Supreme Court cases
that involved advanced technology relative to the time the Court
decided the case. These cases might provide guidelines on how a court
should handle advanced sensing technology. Section VI will explore
how lower courts have dealt with the “general public use” test. Except
for a brief mention in a footnote, the Supreme Court did not provide
any definition or formula to determine when the technology is in
general public use. 17 The lower courts have struggled to use this test
and instead avoid it entirely and rule on cases using other elements of
the case. Section VI will discuss and then provide a workable
definition of the “general public use” test. Section VIII will explain
why the property analysis is the proper framework to analyze advanced
sensing technology. Section IX will conclude by proposing that to
preserve the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
should eliminate the “general public use” test and only use the property
test.
II.

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

To understand the principle of the Fourth Amendment, it is
important to discuss the events that influenced the Framers and the
initial applications of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 18
17
18

Id. at 39 n.6.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Searching for the original meaning in an amendment provides
inherent difficulties because the Framers “had no opportunity to
confront them [modern practices] or to consider the fundamentally
different social conditions of today.” 19 However, courts can
reasonably ascertain the intent of the Framers through their words, the
historical context, and the final draft of the Amendment. 20 John
Adams advised that “[i]n unforeseen cases, that is, when the state of
things is found such as the author of the disposition has not foreseen,
and could not have thought of, we should rather follow his intention
than his words, and interpret the act as he himself would have
interpreted it.” 21
The Framers created the Fourth Amendment to protect against
general warrants 22 and writs of assistance. 23 The “English customs
officers enforced promiscuous searches vigorously and often in the
American colonies.” 24 Those searches heavily influenced “the Fourth
Amendment’s framers when they rejected general warrants in 1789.”25
Search and seizure of colonial ships were extensive because “[t]he
same statute that codified writs of assistance in 1662 enabled British
customs officers to search everything afloat at all times and without
warrant.” 26 In June 1768, the British seized John Hancock’s ship
Liberty. 27 The British seized the ship on “two separate counts of
smuggling,” 28 but Bostonians protested that the Liberty was seized

James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of
the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 671 (1985) (citing Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396 (1974)).
20 See infra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
21 Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1060 (2011) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Framers’ Intent].
22 “The general warrant, issued by a magistrate, provided government officials with an
unlimited ability to search the home of anyone listed in the warrant, regardless of the nature
of the violation alleged.” Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The
Loss of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard, 107 DICK.
L. REV. 179, 181 n.14 (2002).
23 “The writ of assistance is most easily described as a form of a general warrant. Under a
writ of assistance, issued by a magistrate, customs officials could engage in arbitrary and
effectively limitless searches of any home in which they suspected that prohibited goods may
be located.” Id. at 181 n.15.
24 WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 6021791, at 258 (2009).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 419 (citing 13 and 14 Charles II, c.11, sec. 4 (1662), S.L., vol. 8, pg. 80).
27 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019.
28 CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 589 n.54 (citation omitted).
19
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with insufficient probable cause. 29 The evidence that supported the
seizure was circumstantial, 30 and the colonists felt the seizure was
politically motivated. 31 The uproar led to British troops being sent to
Boston. 32 The result was the Boston Massacre in March 1770. 33
During the American Revolution a few years later, the American rebels
used general warrants to aid in the revolution against Britain. 34
A Massachusetts law in 1777, which was used to identify
Loyalists, allowed “the council to declare any person dangerous to the
state, and authorized warrants by which sheriffs could ‘break open any
dwelling house or other building’ in which they suspected that such a
person was concealed.” 35 In New York, “the Albany Committee of
Correspondence allowed a colonel to ‘search . . . such places and
Houses as he shall think proper’ for deserters from his detachment. 36
The largest search performed during the revolution targeted the
Philadelphia Quakers. 37 The Continental Congress asked the Supreme
Executive Council of Pennsylvania to “search the house of every
Philadelphian of dubious loyalty and disarm him.” 38 The Continental
Congress then passed a second resolve sent to every state government
and advised them to seize every Quaker and their papers. 39 After the
war, the general warrant “remained the orthodox mode of search and
seizure in five states: New York, Maryland, both Carolinas, and
Georgia.” 40 A general warrant was based on information provided
under oath; however, the general warrant provided its bearer “‘to enter
into and search . . . all cellars, shops, warehouses, and suspected
places,’ using force if necessary.” 41

Id. at 589 (“[T]he Liberty, had been seized without ‘any probable cause of seizure that
we know of.’” (citation omitted)).
30 Id. at 590.
31 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019-20; CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 590.
32 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019 (citing Admiralty-Revenue Jurisdiction, Editorial
Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106, at 98, 103 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel
eds., 1965)).
33 Id. (citing LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 98, 103).
34 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 613-23.
35 Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
36 Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 618.
38 Id.
39 Id. (“[A] pacifist manifesto evinced the disloyalty of many prominent Quakers.”).
40 Id. at 623-24.
41 Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
29
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In the years following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,
its interpretation and application was similar yet different from our
modern analysis. 42 In addition to providing protection against general
warrants and writs of assistance, the Fourth Amendment protected
people from unreasonable government intrusions by ensuring certain
criteria were met before a search was conducted. 43 First, probable
cause was required. 44 The protection afforded by probable cause is
that the allegations are true 45 and reduces arbitrary intrusions. 46 At the
time of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause was not as robust as
the current analysis. 47 In the modern context, probable cause in 1789
can be understood as information alleged to be at least possible or
plausible. 48
Second, certain searches were deemed unreasonable. 49
Unreasonable searches included multiple-specific warrants, house
searches without warrants, nocturnal searches, and “no-knock”
searches. 50 Third, certain objects were highly valued. 51 The Fourth
Amendment lists “four protected objects: persons, houses, papers, and
effects.” 52 The home has enjoyed special protection from very early
times 53 and can be viewed as a place where individuals can enjoy the
privileges afforded to them by a free society. 54 The protection of these
objects ensures a person’s right to “the free enjoyment of personal
security, of personal liberty, and of private property.” 55
See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
See Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1056.
44 Id.
45 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 754 (explaining that probable cause is supported by an
oath or affirmation).
46 See Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1006-10, 1057. “Underlying all of those arguments
and principles was a quest for objective criteria to measure the legitimacy of a search or
seizure.” Id. at 1006.
47 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 755 (“The current understanding of probable cause,
however, is broader than that of 1789.”).
48 Id. at 757 (“‘Probable’ had diverse meanings in 1789: ‘likely,’ ‘possible,’ even
‘credible.’”).
49 Id. at 770.
50 Id.
51 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1058.
52 Id.
53 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 673. “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail . . . but the King of England may not enter; all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.” Id. at 673 n.120 (quoting 1 T.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610 n.2 (8th ed. 1927)).
54 See id. at 674.
55 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1059 (citation omitted).
42
43
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The structure and wording of the Fourth Amendment illustrate
the principles of search and seizure the Framers were advocating.56
The Reasonableness Clause “recognized as already existing a right to
freedom from arbitrary governmental invasion of privacy.” 57 The
second clause defines and interprets the first clause and provides that
searches using the specified methods are not unreasonable. 58 Further
explanation of the Reasonableness Clause provides that searches must
be carried out with judicial approval or they will be considered per se
unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” 59
In considering the Framers’ intent, one can use John Adams’s
60
advice. When there is a situation that the author of an act did not
account for, then one should follow the author’s intention and interpret
it as he “would have interpreted it.” 61 Applying this advice to the
search and seizure practice before the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, the Framers intended for the Amendment to protect people
against unreasonable government intrusion. 62 The Fourth Amendment
protects against physical intrusions of a person’s home and seizures of
their person, papers, and effects. 63 However, a person is not protected
when a loophole provides for warrantless searches. The “general
public use” test is a loophole and contradicts the principles of the
Fourth Amendment. The “general public use” test permits a home to
be searched without a warrant issued under probable cause supported
by an oath or affirmation.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROPERTYBASED ANALYSIS

Property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in its first
iteration, was based on a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment. 64
56

text.

See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text; see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying

Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 983 (citation omitted).
Id.
59 Id. at 984 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)).
60 Id. at 1060.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 988.
63 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 673; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 361
(2d ed. 2014).
57
58
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The Court described the physical trespass property-based analysis of
the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead v. United States. 65 Olmstead
involved a criminal organization created “to import, possess, and sell
liquor unlawfully.” 66 The criminal organization was discovered using
wiretaps. 67 The Court reasoned that “[t]here was no searching. . . . The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.” 68 The
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when
something tangible is seized or the trespass is a physical intrusion.69
After Olmstead, cases were decided by “whether the government had
physically entered a protected area.” 70
In Katz v. United States, 71 the Supreme Court seemingly
abandoned the Olmstead view of the Fourth Amendment. 72 An
electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth
was a search under the Fourth Amendment requiring a search
warrant. 73 The Government argued that there was no reason to invoke
the Fourth Amendment because there was “no physical penetration of
the telephone booth.” 74 The Court reasoned “that the Fourth
Amendment protects people – and not simply ‘areas.’” 75 The Fourth
Amendment principle derived from Katz is that a search has not
occurred “unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’” 76 Katz asserted “that
privacy, not property, was a centralizing principle upon which the
Fourth Amendment rights were premised.” 77
277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 455-56.
67 Id. at 456-57.
68 Id. at 464.
69 Id. at 466. The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment is only violated when there
is “an official search and seizure of his person . . . papers or tangible material effects, or an
actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.” Id.
70 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 87 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
71 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72 The reach of the Fourth Amendment “cannot turn upon a physical intrusion.” See id. at
353.
73 See id. at 352-59.
74 Id. at 352.
75 Id. at 353.
76 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
77 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 88.
65
66
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After Katz, the property-based analysis did not vanish
entirely. 78 The property-based analysis was most prominent in the
application of seizure cases such as Soldal v. Cook County. 79 Soldal
involved an illegal seizure of a mobile home, but the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the removal of the trailer was not a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 80 The Seventh Circuit held that
“absent interference with privacy or liberty, a ‘pure deprivation of
property’ is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.” 81 The
Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals’ narrow view of the Fourth Amendment. 82 The Court stated
that “our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects
property as well as privacy.” 83 The cases decided following Katz did
not eliminate protection of property; 84 the message to derive from
those cases is that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth
Amendment violations.” 85 Soldal dealt with the Fourth Amendment
concerning a seizure. 86 Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in Soldal
created the foundation for a re-emergence of property-analysis
searches. 87
Kyllo is a stepping-stone on the re-emergence of the property
analysis. In Kyllo, the Court uses property-based language when it
references constitutionally protected areas, explains privacy violations
by using physical intrusion as a reference point, and describes what the
Framers protected when the Fourth Amendment was created. 88
Nonetheless, Kyllo did not ignore “the essential lesson of Katz,” which
See id. at 106-07.
506 U.S. 56 (1992).
80 See id. at 57-60.
81 Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
82 See id. at 62 (“[C]onclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which
the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests . . . leaving unprotected
possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty were at stake.”).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 64 (“There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the
previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment.”).
85 Id.
86 See id. at 60-70.
87 See id. at 62-65; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (“[T]he Court
unanimously rejected the argument that although a ‘seizure’ had occurred ‘in a “technical”
sense’. . . no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because law enforcement had not
‘invade[d] the [individuals’] privacy.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
88 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35, 38, 40 (2001). “This assures preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.” Id. at 34.
78
79
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is that the Fourth Amendment protected “tangible and intangible
interests and that the mode of invasion into those interests is not limited
to physical intrusions.” 89
In United States v. Jones, 90 the Court explained the coexistence of the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the
property-based analysis. Jones involved the long-term surveillance of
a car using GPS. 91 The GPS was physically attached to the car. 92 The
Court held that the attachment of the GPS device to the car was a
search. 93 The Government argued that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the exterior of the Jeep. 94 The Court ignored
the argument entirely “because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” 95 There is a minimum level
of protection against the government that “Katz did not repudiate.”96
The Court further explained that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.” 97
The property-based analysis provides a bright-line rule; the
government cannot intrude on a home and curtilage without a
warrant. 98 Dog sniffs illustrate the effect of the bright-line rule because
the Court has treated dog sniffs differently at other locations. 99 In
Florida v. Jardines, 100 the Court held that a narcotics dog sniff
penetrating the curtilage 101 of the home is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 102 The Court affirmed that the Fourth Amendment
89 CLANCY, supra note 64, at 109; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (“We rejected such a
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz . . . . Reversing that approach
would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”).
90 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
91 Id. at 402.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 404.
94 Id. at 406.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 406-07.
97 Id. at 409.
98 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2013).
99 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding a canine sniff of luggage
in an airport is not a search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding a canine
sniff during a traffic stop is not a search).
100 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
101 Id. at 6-7. “We therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with
the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes.’” Id. at 6 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
102 Id. at 11.
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property-based analysis is the minimum level of protection provided
to people in their homes. 103 Jardines is an example of how the property
based analysis can protect the home. Under the Katz formula, Justice
Alito, writing for the dissent, would have allowed the dog sniff because
“[a] reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house
may be detected from locations that are open to the public.”104
However, since the porch is part of the curtilage of the home, “[t]he
scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose.” 105
Current property-based analysis recognizes that a trespass to
property can be physical or intangible. 106 The Court has explained that
property-based analysis is one of several frameworks for analyzing
Fourth Amendment searches. 107 Additionally, the Court has affirmed
that certain areas are constitutionally protected areas that are not
modified by an expectation of privacy. 108 Therefore, the current
property-based analysis is grounded in the original principles of the
Fourth Amendment and upgraded by the understanding of unseen
intrusions. 109
IV.

CURRENT ADVANCED SENSING TECHNOLOGY

Imagine a situation similar to Kyllo in the year 2025. A law
enforcement officer suspects there is a marijuana growing operation in
a home. The officer stands on the sidewalk outside of the home,
retrieves his or her cellphone, and performs an infrared scan of the
home. Law enforcement uses the information obtained from the
103

See id.
Id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 9. “Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not
invite him there to conduct a search.” Id.
106 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[W]e rejected in Kyllo a
‘mechanical interpretation’ of the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 35 (2001)).
107 See id. at 2214 n.1 (“Property rights are often informative . . . and we have repeatedly
emphasized privacy interests do not rise and fall with property rights.”) (citations omitted)).
The Court stated that “no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are
entitled to protection.” Id. at 2213-14. “[M]ore recent Fourth Amendment cases have clarified
that the test . . . derived from the second Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz . . . supplements,
rather than displaces, ‘the traditional property-based understanding.’” Byrd v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018) (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11)
108 See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (holding that the officer was not
permitted to enter the curtilage of the home to search a vehicle).
109 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 106-115, 388-390.
104
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cellphone scan, and other information such as utility bills, to obtain a
search warrant. Law enforcement officers search the house. Is the
infrared scan performed by the officer an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment? Under Kyllo, if an average person can also
perform an infrared scan with a cellphone, then the search was not
unreasonable. 110 While this scenario appears speculative, it is not.
Infrared camera attachments for cellphones are already a reality.111
Beyond the infrared scanning, law enforcement is also using seethrough wall technology. 112 The see-through the wall technology is
also steadily progressing into the realm of “general public use.”113
Anyone who wants to perform repairs or construction, whether
professionally or amateur, can use this technology to find wall studs,
pipes, and wires behind walls. 114 The technology is also being
employed in various settings to track people through walls for security
or health monitoring. 115 If a person can buy a device and use it for a
construction project at home, is that device now considered in “general
public use?” When does a device transition into general public use?
Is it a matter of scope, depending on how far past the wall the device
can detect objects? Arguably, this technology is in public use.
Applying the Kyllo test, a law enforcement official can scan the inside
of a home without requiring a search warrant. Examining these
devices in more detail will provide an understanding of their capacity
to violate the Fourth Amendment.
The National Institute of Justice has classified several handheld devices as through-the-wall sensors (“TTWS”). 116 These devices
include Range-R series, 117 Xaver series, 118 ReTWis 5, 119 and the
See Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 24 (2001).
See infra notes 146, 148 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
114 How
Do Stud Finders Work? Complete Tutorial + Tips and Tricks,
ELECTRICSTUDFINDER.COM, http://electricstudfinder.com/how-do-stud-finders-work/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2020) [hereinafter ELECTRICSTUDFINDER].
115 VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
116 MANTECH ADVANCED SYS. INT’L. INC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THROUGH-THE-WALLSENSORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT MARKET SURVEY 1 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00WallSensorReport-508.pdf [hereinafter MARKET SURVEY].
117 The Range-R series includes several models: Range-R, Range-R Link, Range-R 2D,
Range-R 2D Link. Military and First Responders, CYTERRA, L3HARRIS,
https://www2.l3t.com/cyterra/ (last visited May 8, 2020).
118 The Xaver series includes several models: Xaver 100, 400, 800. Xaver Products,
CAMERO, https://www.camero-tech.com/xaver-products/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
119 About ReTWis 5, RETIA, https://retwis.eu/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
110
111
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Eagle5-NCL. 120 TTWS devices use radar 121 transmitted at low power
and across several frequencies. 122 The radar penetrates walls and
reflects when it comes into contact with an object or different
materials. 123 As the radar reflects off the objects or materials, the
frequency shifts, and the measurement “distinguishes between
stationary and moving objects.” 124 When radar passes through objects,
it becomes attenuated. 125 Attenuation is the loss of signal strength.126
Attenuation is reduced by using a wide range of frequencies to “probe”
the area. 127 To provide as much information about the area being
“probed,” and to minimize attenuation problems, TTWS devices will
use either a Pulse Wave System or an Ultra-Wide Band Pulse System
(UWB). 128 The difference between these two systems is the amount of
information they relay back to the device. 129 One specific limitation
of the technology is that it cannot see through solid metal surfaces, 130
but it can operate through concrete and wood. 131
The devices can display information gathered in 1 degree (“d”),
2d, or 3d. 132 Other differences between the devices include various
technical specifications such as the degrees of the field of view, the
maximum distance of the scan, weight, and battery life.133

120 TiaLinx Unveils New Breathing Detection Sensor to Identify Multiple Individuals
SENSORS
(July
13,
2016),
Through
Thick
Concrete
Walls,
AZO
https://www.azosensors.com/news.aspx?newsID=11326.
121 Types of radar used include: Continuous Wave System, Pulse Wave System, and UltraWide Band Pulse System. MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 9-14.
122 Becky Lewis, Through-the-Wall Sensor Technology Can Add Another Tool to the Kit,
TECHBEAT 1 (2013), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/Through-the-Wall.pdf.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 4.
126 Id. at 4.
127 Id. at 5.
128 See id. at 5-6.
129 See id. at 4-6, 11-14.
130 Lewis, supra note 122, at 1.
131 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 4.
132 1d, 2d, and 3d are shorthand for the dimensions provided by the display. The difference
between 1d and 2d is that 1d provides the range and status (moving/breathing) of the target
and 2d will provide a graphic display of the area scanned, such as the general shape of the
room, and multiple persons in the room. See MANTECH ADVANCED SYS. INT’L. INC., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THROUGH-THE-WALL-SENSORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: BEST PRACTICES
10 (2014), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/ThroughWallSensorBestPractices-508.pdf.
133 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 11-16.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2020], Art. 9

590

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

Additionally, the devices also differ in price. For example, a Range-R
will cost $6,000, but a Xaver-400 will cost $47,500. 134
Commercial applications of see-through the wall radar come in
various forms. One type of these devices is called a stud finder.135
Stud finders use UWB radar to locate studs, pipes, and electronic wires
in a wall. 136 An example of this device is the Bosch D-Tect 150. As
of this writing, it is selling on Amazon for $699.36. 137 The Bosch DTect 150 has several detection modes, and it can detect objects between
one to six inches, depending on the material. 138 See-through the wall
radar is also being sold as a home monitoring system. One company
currently selling this system is Vayyar. 139 The Vayyar chip uses radar
bands in the three gigahertz to 81 gigahertz range along with 72
receivers and transmitters to track people through walls and is capable
of detecting their “location, movement, height, posture, and vital
signs.” 140 The Vayyar HOME can be combined with various
appliances, lighting, and heating for home automation. 141 Three other
uses for the system include eldercare, detecting if someone has fallen
in the home, or monitoring the health of people in a home. 142 Finally,
Vayyar HOME helps in home security by detecting when everyone has
fallen asleep and will then detect if an intruder has entered, at which
time an alarm is activated. 143
In Kyllo, the Agema-210 was an infrared thermal imager. 144
Heat detecting devices have been around for several decades. 145
Infrared thermal imaging devices have continued to advance from the
Id. at 15.
ELECTRICSTUDFINDER, supra note 114.
136 Id.
137 Bosch D-Tect 150, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Bosch-D-Tect-Floor-ScannerTechnology/dp/B005EM93R0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
138
D-Tect
150
Product
Description,
BOSCH,
https://www.boschtools.com/us/en/boschtools-ocs/stud-finders-d-tect-150-29179-p/
(last
visited Jan. 18, 2020).
139 VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
140 Technology, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/technology (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
141 Smart Home, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/smart-home (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
142 Home Health, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/home (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).
143 Home Security and Fire, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/home-security-and-fire (last
visited Jan. 18, 2020).
144 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
145 The first thermographic camera was created by Kálmán Tihanyi in 1929. Nic Fleming,
The Man who Makes you See the Invisible, BBC (June 14, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170614-thermal-imaging-reveals-the-hidden-heat-lostfrom-your-home.
134
135
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time of the Kyllo decision; many different models are available to the
average person. 146 These products are cheaper than the Agema-210147
and provide more detail and accuracy than the Agema-210. 148 If the
average person has access to thirty models of infrared cameras and
even the ability to attach an infrared camera to their smartphone, it is
arguably in “general public use.” Under the current Kyllo rule, a police
officer using one of these devices to scan a home without a warrant
would not be violating the Fourth Amendment. The Kyllo rule
loophole is already a possibility.
V.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

While it is impossible to predict the exact path technological
progress will take, the trend is usually for smaller and more portable. 149
The evolution of the infrared camera displays this trend; the infrared
camera evolved from large bulky devices to attachments that people
At the time of this writing, 30 products are available and some products have different
models.
See
Handheld
Thermal
Cameras,
FLIR,
https://www.flir.com/browse/industrial/handheld-thermal-cameras/?page=2 (last visited Mar.
8, 2020). Thermal cameras can also attach to a smartphone. FLIR ONE Pro, FLIR,
https://www.flir.com/products/flir-one-pro/?model=435-0006-02 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
The PerfectPrime is an infrared camera available on Amazon that comes in different models
and ranges in price from $129.99 to $299.99 at the time of this writing. PerfectPrime IR0002
Thermal Camera, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Perfect-Prime-IR0001-InfraredResolution Temperature/dp/B075F61GFH?ref_=fsclp_pl_dp_5 (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
147 Considering the time when the Agema-210 was used, it probably cost at least $10,000.
See Adam W. Brill, Case Note, Kyllo v. United States: Is the Court’s Bright-Line Rule on
Thermal Imaging Written in Disappearing Ink?, 56 ARK. L. REV. 431, 433 n.13 (2003)
(reporting that thermal imagers range from $15,000 to $35,000); see also Ed Kochanek,
Thermal Imaging from the Beginning of the Thermographer’s Camera to the Present,
IRINFO.ORG, https://irinfo.org/12-1-2013-kochanek/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (explaining
that a thermal camera sold for $25,000 in 1997).
148 Contrast the Agema-210 technical specification with a $10,000+ modern model or the
smartphone camera. AGEMA INFRARED SYSTEMS, THERMOVISION 210 SERIES OPERATING
MANUAL
Section
6
at
1-9
(2002),
https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/1557627$a.pdf; AGEMA INFRARED SYSTEMS,
THERMOVISION
400
&
200
(1990),
https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/1557569$a.pdf; FLIR, TECHNICAL DATA
FLIR T5XX SERIES (2019), https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/t810463-enus.pdf; FLIR, FLIR One Pro, https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/17-1746-oemflir_one_pro_datasheet_final_v1_web.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
149 See From Bricks to Brains: The Evolution of the Cell Phone, COMPUTER SCIENCE DEGREE
HUB, https://www.computersciencedegreehub.com/cell-phone/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020);
Frank Olito, Computers Actually Date Back to the 1930s. Here’s How They’ve Changed,
INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2019, 12:13 PM) https://www.insider.com/how-computers-evolvedhistory-2019-9.
146
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can place on a phone. 150 A corollary to this progress is that devices
created for the military might become available for the general public;
an example of this progress is the internet 151 and GPS devices. 152 With
this trend in mind, judging the validity of a search on whether the
public is using an item is a precarious position.
In assessing the proper lens to view advanced sensing
technology searches, an analysis of how the Supreme Court has dealt
with other types of technology and its rationale in these cases might
provide insight.
Justice Harlan’s “oft-quoted concurrence” 153 established the
Katz subjective expectation of privacy test. 154 Considering the
influence of the concurrence, one should examine Justice Harlan’s
reasoning. Interestingly, Justice Harlan anchored his opinion in
relation to a place. 155 The Fourth Amendment protects people, but the
amount of protection afforded is related to a place. 156 “Thus a man’s
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy . . . .”157
However, “objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the
‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited.” 158 Justice Harlan concluded
that basing Fourth Amendment violations on physical trespass was no
longer viable because law enforcement can use electronic means to
defeat a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 159
The
concurrence and majority opinion responded to the electronic listening
device by extending “protection to intangible interests.” 160
In United States v. Karo, 161 a beeper was used to trace a can of
ether. DEA agents learned that James Karo, Richard Horton, and
William Harley ordered 50 cans of ether to extract cocaine from
See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
Evan
Andrews,
Who
Invented
the
Internet?,
HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/news/who-invented-the-internet (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
152 Global
Positioning
System
History,
NASA,
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS_History.html (last
updated Aug. 7, 2017).
153 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
154 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 92.
155 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 362.
160 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 89.
161 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
150
151
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imported clothing. 162 Agents replaced one of the cans of the ether with
their can that contained the beeper. 163 Eventually, on February 6, 1981,
the can of ether was transported to a home in Taos, New Mexico. 164
The “agents determined, using the beeper monitor[,] that the beeper
can was still inside the house.” 165 On February 7, the beeper reported
the ether can was still in the house. 166 Based partly on this information,
the agents acquired a warrant on February 8, 1981. 167 The Court held
that the warrantless use of the beeper was a search that violated the
Fourth Amendment. 168 The home is where an “individual normally
expects privacy.” 169 The Court reasoned that where the Government
uses “an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house,” it is
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 170 Unfortunately for the defendants, after striking the
beeper information, the warrant affidavit contained enough
information to support probable cause for a search warrant. 171
While not strictly human-made like other technologies are,
narcotics sniffing dogs can also be described as a sense-enhancing
technology. 172 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, decided
Jardines on property grounds. 173 The government argued that law
enforcement investigation of a home by a forensic narcotics dog “by
definition could not implicate any legitimate privacy interest.” 174
However, as Justice Scalia explained, the home and curtilage are a
constitutionally protected area that is unaffected by expectations of

Id. at 708.
Id.
164 Id. at 709.
165 Id. at 709-10.
166 Id. at 710.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 714-15.
169 Id. at 714.
170 Id. at 715.
171 Id. at 721.
172 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring). But cf. United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding a canine sniff of luggage in an airport is not a
search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding a canine sniff during a traffic stop
is not a search).
173 See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3-12. “The Katz reasonable-expectations of privacy test ‘has
been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 11 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012)).
174 Id. at 10.
162
163
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privacy. 175 If law enforcement intrudes upon a constitutionally
protected area without authorization, then a violation of the Fourth
Amendment has occurred. 176 Justice Kagan, in a concurring opinion,
reasoned that the case could have been decided using Kyllo. 177 A
narcotics sniffing dog is similar to a sense enhancing tool that is not in
“general public use” because the narcotics dog can explore details of
the home that have an expectation of privacy. 178 Justice Kagan’s
application of Kyllo is sound because the general public does not use
narcotics dogs. However, deciding Jardines through the Kyllo test
would have further weakened the constitutionally protected areas
through the use of the “general public use” test. In using the property
analysis, the Court affirmed the minimum level of protection provided
by the curtilage. 179
VI.

HOW THE LOWER COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE
GENERAL PUBLIC USE TEST

In Kyllo, the Supreme Court did not provide a definition or
outline to determine when an item is in “general public use.”180
Because the Supreme Court did not provide direction for the lower
courts, the resulting jurisprudence has not been consistent. 181 Courts
have avoided determining whether an item is in “general public use,”
unless the item, such as a camera, is easily considered to be in “general
public use.” 182
A state appeals court avoided examination of an item’s
“general public use” in McClelland v. State. 183 Daryl J. McClelland
was arrested by police officers who were investigating individuals who

Id. at 5-11.
Id. at 10-12.
177 Id. at 14 (Kagan, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 14-15 (Kagan J., concurring).
179 See id. at 5.
180 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001) (“Given that we can quite confidently
say that thermal imagining is not ‘routine,’ we decline in this case to reexamine that factor.”).
181 See McClelland v. State, 255 So. 3d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); United States v.
Hachey, No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192 (D. Pa. 2017); United States v. Vela, 486
F. Supp 2d 587 (D. Tex. 2005); United States v. Deleston, No. 15-cr-113, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107341 (D.N.Y. 2015); Idaho v. Howard, No. CR-2011-2029, 2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS
31 (2012).
182 See cases cited supra note 181.
183 255 So. 3d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
175
176
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downloaded child pornography. 184
The police officers traced
McClelland’s Wi-Fi signal using a Yagi antenna. 185 At trial,
McClelland moved to suppress the child pornography found on his
computer because “the Yagi antenna constituted an enhanced
technology which breached the expectation of privacy that McClelland
had within his motorhome.” 186 The trial court concluded that
McClelland did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because
he was broadcasting signals outside his motorhome and that the use of
the Yagi antenna was lawful because it was in “general public use.” 187
The Florida District Court of Appeal reviewing the case declined to
examine the issue of “general public use” because it was sufficient that
McClelland lacked an expectation of privacy. 188 Further, the District
Court of Appeal reasoned that unlike Kyllo, who confined his activities
to his home, McClelland “extend[ed] ‘an invisible, virtual arm,’” 189
which put him “beyond the safe harbor provided by Kyllo.” 190 As
McClelland illustrates, the property-based analysis of Kyllo extends an
impenetrable wall to the home because the Supreme Court expanded it
to “any information regarding the interior of the home.” 191
Courts have decided that night vision goggles, flashlights, and
cameras are in “general public use.” 192 Courts have not provided indepth analyses as to why these products are in the “general public
use.” 193 Flashlights or cameras do not require an in-depth analysis
because of their availability as consumer products for decades. 194 As

Id. at 930-31.
Id.
186 Id. at 931.
187 Id. at 932.
188 Id. at 932 n.2 (“It is unnecessary for us to make any determination regarding whether
this was an accurate conclusion due to our agreement with the trial court that McClelland
lacked an expectation of privacy that society would be willing to recognize as reasonable.”).
189 Id. at 933 (citation omitted).
190 Id. at 934 (citation omitted).
191 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
192 See United States v. Vela, 486 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W. D. Tex. 2005); United States v.
Deleston, No. 15-cr-113, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107341 (D.N.Y. 2015); Idaho v. Howard,
No. CR-2011-2029, 2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 31 (2012).
193 See cases cited supra note 192.
194 The first camera was introduced in 1888. Original Kodak Camera Serial No. 540, NAT’L
MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_760118
(last visited Jan. 18, 2020). The flashlight was patented in 1899. Mary Bellis, The Invention
(last
updated
Feb.
26,
2019),
of
the
Flashlight,
THOUGHTCO.
https://www.thoughtco.com/invention-of-the-flashlight-1991794.
184
185
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for the night vision goggles, the court in United States v. Vela195
reasoned that “they are available to the public via internet. More
economical night vision goggles are available at sporting goods stores.
Therefore, night vision goggles . . . are available for general public
use.” 196
United States v. Stanley 197 involved MoocherHunter, which is
a software that police use to locate computers that are piggy-backing
onto other Wi-Fi routers. 198 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held the use of the software was not a Fourth Amendment search.199
The court summarized its reasoning in two points. First, if a person is
intentionally sharing his or her activities outside of the confines of the
home, then the privacy protections afforded by the home are lost. 200
Second, a person who uses a third-party Wi-Fi router without consent
in an attempt to disguise a signal’s origin has no legitimate expectation
of privacy. 201 In this case, the government did not argue that the
MoocherHunter can be defined as an item in “general public use.”202
However, since it is a “software tool that can be downloaded for free
. . . and used by anyone with a laptop computer and directional
antennae,” 203 it is arguably in “general public use.” Stanley is an
example of another case decided on grounds other than the “general
public use” test.
VII.

A DEFINITION OF GENERAL PUBLIC USE

Another source that can be examined to define “general public
use” is the definitions section of the Federal Acquisition Regulations
System. 204 Under section 2.101, there are eight types of items that are
considered commercial items. 205 Relevant portions include:
486 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
Id. at 590.
197 753 F.3d 114, 115-17 (3d Cir. 2014).
198 The MoocherHunter is a software tool that uses “a laptop computer and a directional
antenna.” Id. at 116. “[T]he “user enters the MAC address of the wireless card he wishes to
locate[,] and the program measures the signal strength of the radio waves emitted from this
card.” Id.
199 See id. at 120-122.
200 Id. at 119-20.
201 Id. at 120-21. “Stanley, was in effect, a virtual trespasser.” Id. at 120.
202 Id. at 119.
203 Id. at 116.
204 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (LEXIS through the Sept. 9, 2019 issue of the Federal Register).
205 Id.
195
196
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(1) Any item, other than real property, that is of a type
customarily used by the general public or by nongovernmental entities for purposes other than
governmental purposes, and
(i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general
public; or
(ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the
general public;
Commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) item - (1) means any item of supply (including construction
material) that is - (i) A commercial item (as defined in paragraph (1) of
the definition in this section);
(ii) Sold in substantial quantities in the commercial
marketplace; 206
When considering these factors and the lower court
decisions, 207 an item is in “general public use” when two conditions
are met. First, is the item accessible to an average person? An item is
accessible if the item can be bought at a store or on the internet. An
item is not accessible if it is only available to the government. Second,
what is the level of difficulty in acquiring the item? While an item
may be accessible to the public, the item’s price can increase the
difficulty in obtaining the item. An item that costs $10,000 is much
more challenging to acquire than an item that costs $100, even if the
item is available to the general public. If these factors are applied, a
camera, a flashlight, and night vision goggles available in sporting
goods stores and the internet would be found in “general public use.”
Additionally, applying these factors would also place current thermal
imaging and some see-through the wall devices in the “general public
use” category.
VIII. COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE ADVANCED SENSING
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A PROPERTY ANALYSIS
Courts should analyze advanced sensing technology under a
property rubric. Property analysis provides a bright-line for courts to
use. The property-based cases illustrate this. In Kyllo, the Court
206
207

Id.
See cases cited supra note 181.
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declined to determine if there was a difference between thermal
information coming off the wall or through the wall. 208 This type of
analysis is too mechanical, “the approach would leave the homeowner
at the mercy of advancing technology.” 209 In Collins and Jardines,
once the curtilage was invaded, further analysis was unnecessary. 210
There is a license to walk up to a door and knock as custom dictates, 211
but “[t]here is no customary invitation” 212 to engage in a forensic dog
search of the area around the door. 213 In Collins, a motorcycle under a
tarp was protected from a police search because it fell under the
umbrella of the curtilage. 214 The Court did not see a reason to apply
the vehicle exception. 215 The Court explained the protection of the
curtilage by analogy to another scenario:
Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of
a house, visible through a window to a passerby on the
street. Imagine further that an officer has probable
cause to believe that the motorcycle was involved in a
traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a
warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and
confirm whether it is the right one? Surely not. 216
The Court in Jones did not determine “thorny” questions of
which length of time or quality of surveillance intruded on Jardines’
reasonable expectation of privacy. 217 Instead, the physical intrusion of
the device on the car was enough to decide the violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 218 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jardines,
provided a succinct reason to use the property analysis. Justice Scalia

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-39 (2001).
Id. at 35.
210 “[W]e need not decide whether the officers’ investigation of Jardines’ home violated his
expectation of privacy under Katz.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). “The
automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a . . . curtilage in
order to search a vehicle therein.” Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018).
211 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7-8.
212 Id. at 9.
213 Id.
214 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670-1672, 1675.
215 Id. at 1671-74.
216 Id. at 1671.
217 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412-13 (2012).
218 Id. at 412-13 (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future
case where a classic trespassory search is not involved . . . but there is no reason for rushing
forward to resolve them here.”).
208
209
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said that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.” 219
After nineteen years, the Supreme Court has yet to provide a
workable framework to determine when an item is in “general public
use.” The Court’s reluctance to define “general public use” provides
further support to no longer using the “general public use” test.
Further, it is likely that even if the Court created a workable framework
for “general public use,” it would nonetheless still leave a loophole to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment. As Section IV shows, it is hard to
imagine a scenario where these advanced sensing technologies will not
be in “general public use” within a decade. Arguably, thermal imagers
are already in that category. 220 If the Court decided cases using the
property analysis, where appropriate, then courts will not have to waste
time determining if an item is in “general public use” or to try to find
an alternative means of deciding the case. Since the property analysis
is a bright-line rule, courts will not be ambivalent as to how they should
proceed. While it is still early in the development cycle of some
advanced technologies, there is no reason to provide police with the
means to evade the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. As
John Adams said, “when the state of things is found such as the author
of the disposition has not foreseen, and could not have thought of . . .
interpret the act as he himself would have interpreted it.” 221 It is
reasonable to conclude from the Framers’ position on unreasonable
searches of their time that they would also find technology that can see
into a person’s home is not a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
The “general public use” standard also contradicts the Kyllo
decision itself. While Kyllo benefitted the property analysis by
adopting the concept of intangible protection from Katz, the “general
public use test” defeats that extra protection. It is a logical fallacy to
create a constitutionally protected area, yet at the same time provide a
means by which law enforcement can intrude upon that area at some
undefined future time.
Similar to the Jardines property-based ruling, a police officer
should not be allowed to invade a home’s curtilage to use a hand-held
or portable advanced sensing device to examine the interior of the
home. Additionally, as the property-analysis also protects against
219
220
221

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S 1, 11 (2013).
See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1060 (citation omitted).
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intangible intrusions of a constitutionally protected area, then a search
of a home beyond the curtilage with advanced sensing technology
should also not be allowed.
The rule would not be complete without the exigent
circumstances exception. The use of advanced searching technology
without a warrant should be allowed in those specific circumstances. 222
Further, the courts should account for the naked eye observation of a
law enforcement official as an exception. 223 A reasonable application
of the naked eye observation exception is illustrated by a hypothetical
scenario. A police officer views contraband or illegal activity through
a window from a public area. The police officer can then, within a
reasonable time frame from the observation, use the advanced sensing
technology to provide further information. Of course, even under the
naked eye observation, the officer should be held to the exigency
standard. The situation must call for a “warrantless search [that] is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 224 Therefore, if
the situation observed meets the exigency standard for warrantless
entry, then it follows that an advanced sensing search would also be
valid.
IX.

CONCLUSION

This Note is not intended to diminish or dismiss the usefulness
of advanced sensing technology to law enforcement officials. These
devices contribute to public safety and crime prevention. However, it
is equally as essential to respect the rights accorded to every person
under the Law and the Constitution.
The Supreme Court intended the Kyllo rule as a bright-line test
for the use of advanced sensing technology. However, the addition of
the “general public use” test defeats that purpose. Technology that can
see into a home is arguably accessible to the general public.
Additionally, courts struggle to apply the “general public use” test.
Therefore, to preserve the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and provide
a clear guide to the lower courts, searches involving advanced sensing
222 Some situations include “hot pursuit,” imminent destruction of evidence, and the
preservation of life. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S 398, 403-04 (2006).
223 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection
of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”).
224 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
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technology should be analyzed under a property analysis. Advanced
sensing technology that invades the curtilage of the home or penetrates
the walls to see into the interior of the home is presumptively
unreasonable and requires a warrant. The new rule is a combination
of Kyllo, and the framework advanced in Katz. The home and the
curtilage are constitutionally protected areas that law enforcement
cannot intrude upon using any method, both physical and intangible.
Therefore, the property analysis would provide coverage well into the
future as science creates new methods to see the unseen.
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